

EDUARD VON HARTMANN'S NOTION OF UNCONSCIOUS
MIND AND ITS METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS.

Susanne K. Langer

June, 1924

Preface.

The following is an attempt to summarize the development of a notion first formulated by Eduard v. Hartmann, but soon employed generally both in philosophy and psychology. A principle used for such diverse purposes as those of Hartmann and of Freud, has naturally taken several discreet forms, and perhaps the hardest task of the philosopher who undertakes to criticize the notion of Unconscious Mind is to find the common element in all the various manifestations of the idea. Yet the common element is there; the Unconscious of Freud rests on the same metaphysical principle as that of Hartmann, so that as metaphysical principle they must stand or fall together.

The acceptance of the theory outlined in this paper does not involve the elimination of the term "Unconscious Mind" from psychology, but does demand recognition for the fact that this term is purely pragmatic and not strictly correct -- that it connotes a fiction such as the mathematicians parallels that "meet at infinity." I think the advantage of the simple, concrete notions of "Unconscious Mind", "repression", "censorship", and the rest of the Freudian mythology, over the complex mathematical scheme here suggested, easily justifies the continued use of the picturesque language in psychology, even upon acceptance of a different metaphysical basis. But in philosophy we should care more about correctness than about pragmatic values, and should be as precise as possible in our statements, even though our concepts become too complicated for any but mathematical expression.

The psychoanalytic literature, Unconscious Mind, in addition to the work of Freud and Jung, has nevertheless attempted a survey of the subject, but this has not been adequately given by Hartmann in his introduction to the Philosophy of the Unconscious.

The psychoanalytic literature has allready grown to astounding proportions, but has remained almost incredibly poor in philosophical material. Freud and Jung are the only authors, to my knowledge, who occasionally offer a "metapsychological" theory; the host of other writers on the subject accept this theory without a murmur. But lately the Unconscious has been treated by a few philosophers, notably Lipps, Dwelshauvers, Herbertz, and casually by Russell; upon their authority I have formed my idea of its evolution from the Unconscious Mind of Hartmann, have found it still to be the old, decried and disputed notion, and have attempted to trace its logical and metaphysical implications.

EDUARD VON HARTMANN'S CONCEPT OF UNCONSCIOUS MIND AND ITS
METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS.

Of Hartmann's Light, and its Obscuring Bushel; Especially the Bushel.

Eduard von Hartmann was a man of the scientific age ~~vv~~ the age of evolutionism, experimentalism, and "inductive" reasoning. This was his misfortune, for his mind was speculative, philosophical, thoroughly unsuited to a scientific career. The nineteenth century was a time of tremendously pronounced ideas, which had grown up so quickly that those spirits who dissented temperamentally could not formulate an intellectual refutation and were forced, for the time being, to accept a cultural dogma which at bottom was not their own. Poetic, philosophical, and religious natures suffered intensely, either consciously like Matthew Arnold, or unconsciously, by the repression of their natural, non-scientific talents and insights, like Eduard von Hartmann. The scientific attitude of Hartmann is simply subservience to a tyrannical popular demand. Had he come before the public in all the simplicity of his own metaphysical convictions, as another post-Kantian idealist (which indeed he was), innocent of all scientific jargon and methodology, he would have gone right quickly and quietly to an undeserved literary grave. But he armed himself with scientific data, according to the gospel of Herbert Spencer; he clothed his perfectly good inspiration in long, endlessly long robes of very flimsy material -- evolution, heredity, mesmerism, mental telepathy -- in short, like many modern philosophers, he took a deep interest in all the half-baked scientific theories of his day and offered a metaphysical panacea that established them and solved their self-contradictions.

had a very wide smattering of scientific data -- from biology, electro-dynamics, anthropology, medicine and half a dozen other disciplines. And he tried to persuade us that the observation of such data led him to his philosophy of The Unconscious.

Some people have believed him. His chief commentator, Arthur Drews, sees in his professed method "the final solution and the close of all methodological researches of the modern age."* Otto Braun devotes half a chapter of eulogy to the motto which graces the title-page of the "Philosophy of the Unconscious", "Speculative results by inductive-scientific method."** Even Volkelt, who is philosophically related to Hartmann the dialectician rather than to Hartmann of the Baconian method, emphasizes the excellence of this pseudo-scientific proceeding and lauds as one of his greatest accomplishments "that he has the need of his time, to raise the Unconscious to the dignity of a world-principle by inductive means."***

Now unfortunately, Hartmann's system does not follow logically from the limited inductive ~~premises~~^{met} which he acknowledges as his ~~premises~~. Particular premises simply cannot yield a universal conclusion; empirical data cannot establish a world principle. Part of the system follows logically, and this part bears upon metaphysics, but it does not give us an ens realissimum, an Absolute, nor even a law of universal application. In a later chapter, a review of Hartmann's premises and conclusions in stark outline will show the breach where certain very important postulates, not empirically obtained nor obtainable, make their appearance in the guise of theorems.

*Arthur Drews, Das Lebenswerk Eduard von Hartmann's. p.15

** Otto Braun, Eduard von Hartmann p.44: "Wir sind hier auf den Punkt gekommen wo wir eine der wichtigsten Leistungen Hartmanns erkennen können: die Forderung der induktiven methode für die gesamte Philosophie, also auch für die Metaphysik. Dadurch wird Hartmann im Prinzip der Denker einer neuen Ers

*** Johannes Volkelt, Das Unbewusste und der Pessimismus. p. 93

I do not propose to check up all his bad arguments, because most of them wear their fallacies on their sleeves; but I do want to point out the general sequence of his thought, to show why his work has met with such excessively diverse receptions, and perchance to formulate a more tempered and plausible evaluation. His critics, it seems, cannot decide whether he was the greatest master of human thought since Kant,* or the most banale half-witted babbler since Adam;† but they are all convinced that he was one or the other. He was, as a matter of fact, very often a babbler, howbeit not exactly a half-witted one; also he was the bearer of a notion that may well appear to threaten another Copernican revolution, but for all that he was not a great thinker. Anyway, this is my general view of him, which I intend to substantiate here.

Hartmann, like Berkeley, was blessed with one great inspiration; this is the source of his whole philosophy and is the only part that will remain as a legacy to the world.*** It is set forth in a single excellent book, Die Philosophie des Unbewussten. To a reader without any scholarly point of view, without further knowledge of Hartmann or his critics, this book appears as a true work of genius -- original, alive, full of irrelevant and untrimmed observations, full of vague side-glances and promises of future researches -- as a point of departure for a new, unCartesian metaphysics, crude as yet in details but clear in its fundamental tennets, and sure of its general direction. It has been indeed a spring of refreshing suggestions for the disinterested, philosophically untrammelled psychologists, who could take its hints for psychology and let all its sleeping dogs lie -- for the metaphysicians to encounter afterward. The psychologists seem, at

* Arthur Drews, in Eduard v. Hartmanns philosophisches System im Grundriss, refers to him as a writer "dessen Hauptwerke zu den höchsten Zierden der philosophischen Weltliteratur gehören."

** J.C. Fischer, Hartmanns Philosophie des Unbewussten, p. 19: "Nur die deutsche Philosophie ist, zu ihrer Schande sei es gesagt, solch absurder Gedanken fähig."

*** Otto Braun, E.v.H. "Dieser Gedanke kam ihm nicht aus 'zerkauerten Schreibfedern', er ist eine tiefe intuition, und ihm verdankt es Hartmann dass er ein grosser Denker ist."

present, to have taken the whole legacy: the notion of Unconscious Mind.*

The metaphysicians, however, suspicious of the sleeping dogs, were very wary in their approach to this new treasure. This was largely due to Hartmann's great mistake of following up his gospel with elucidations; for in the process of elucidating he so successfully hid his original inspiration, and "letting loose the hounds of war cried 'havoc'," that respectable philosophers preferred to treat him as a harmless lunatic, and he found himself -- as his few sympathisers expressed it -- "totgeschwiegen". The immediate cause of his academic death was excess of verbal gymnastics.

The failure of his elucidations was inevitable, not so much because the notion of Unconscious Mind is itself illogical and cannot be defined and defended, as because Hartmann was not thinker enough to analyze what he had compounded. Even the Philosophie des Unbewussten is full of logical inconsistencies and fallacious methodology; in his later writings, where no new and brilliant idea overbalances these blemishes, they become unbearable. Despite the fact that he is forever urging his readers to judge him less by his earlier and more by his later works,**especially his Philosophisches System im Grundriss, it is certainly true that Die Philosophie des Unbewussten is a contribution to human thought whereas the Grundriss makes one suspicious of the author's sanity and desperate of his logic. A few passages may serve to justify this despair. Here, for example, is his discussion of "Logical Determination" which he seems (from this text) to consider an entity having definite relations to other entities:

Philosophie des Unbewussten development the mind in the brain. Note a prediction in Drews' Lebenswerk E.v.H.'s, that physics will accept Hartmann's theories whereas psychology can never have any use for them. ** Die Philosophie des Unbewussten, preface to the ninth edition: "Nun lässt sich aber erfahrungsmässig das Publikum auf keine Weise davon abbringen, immer zuerst nach dem Werke zu greifen, das den Ruf eines Autors zuerst begründet hat, ist dann jedoch fast noch schwere zu dem Glauben zu bringen dass dieser Autor ihm ausser dem Inhalt dieses einen Werkes noch andere, ebenso wichtige oder gar noch wichtigere Dinge zu sagen habe."

"Since all logical determination occurs with logical necessity, it must, under similar conditions, assume similar forms, that is to say it must bear the character of lawfulness.....But in this isolation the logical determination cannot be active at all. For it is itself an empty form, and cannot give to itself the content which it fails to find in itself; it cannot apply itself to itself, but must find something else to which it can apply itself, and only in this way can unfold the possibilities that lie within itself." *

A perfect legion of questions besets the naively logical reader. How can logical determination take place with logical necessity? What is logical and what is necessary prior to logical determination? This logical determination is deprived of the power of action unless saved by Hartmann's theories; who would have suspected it of "acting", anyway? Also, even if saved, how can logical determination "apply itself" to anything? It seems to lose its Hartmannesque character by translation, because the crude English language deprives it of its capital D and the pronoun "she". A speculation about Time, or rather temporality (Zeitlichkeit) fares not much better at the hands of pitiless critics.

"The teleo-dynamic, intensive side of Activity intrinsically possesses temporality, but of a perfectly indeterminate sort; that side of it, however, which is logical determination, is essentially non-temporal, and requires no time, and timelessly determines at every moment the ideal content of Activity. What it expresses is eternally true, eternal relations among possibilities; but as it (the determination) is constrained to apply its eternal logical lawfulness to a temporal Given, it is connected with time in a double sense. On the one hand, every particular act of determination occupies a particular moment of time, be it at the beginning or end of during the process of time. On the other hand, a considerable portion

*Grundriss der Metaphysik, pp. 24-25

the determination is employed in prescribing measures and relations for the indeterminate temporality of the teleo-dynamic side of Activity."*

How can aforesaid determination be "constrained" to apply something to anything? By what secret trap-door has the act of determination crept into the discussion? It is probably unnecessary to drag out this process of vivisection any further, to justify my former statement that Hartmann was not a great thinker. All his logic is of this type. A perusal of the *Grundriss der Metaphysik* leaves one with the feeling of having just stepped off a merry-go-round.

Some of his commentators, however, are positively awed by his logical attainments. This seems explicable only on the assumption that people who from their academic infancy have been fed on post-Kantian terminology, naturally read the thought between the lines without being startled by the lines themselves -- as one follows the general drift of a sermon without noting and interpreting every case of "beloved brethren" and "world without end." It is rather significant that Otto Braun, for example, derives his admiration from the form rather than the content of the works he exalts. What he has gathered from the content is not logic at all -- it is the original notion of the Unconscious, whose appeal to his (unconscious?) mind has enriched and enlivened for him the whole system of philosophy. Or has the German mind really a logic of its own? Are we blind to perfectly clear European concepts? One is tempted to hold this view on the strength of Hartmann's statement concerning "psychical activity";

"Neither is the objection sound, that an unconscious psychical activity is for us unthinkable. 'Activity' is a clear concept, and so is 'psychic'. The combination of the two ~~concepts~~ has no contradiction, therefore it is conceivable. But the concept 'unconscious' likewise is not incompatible

**Grundriss der Metaphysik*, p. 27

** Otto Braun, *E.v.H.*, p. 25: "Hartmann ist ein logisches Genie, das zeigt sich, abgesehen von dem Inhalt seiner Schriften, vor allem in der Form derselben. Er ist ein architektonischer Künstler!"

with that of psychical activity.... "*

Clear concepts are definable in terms of other concepts; if "activity" and "psychic" are clear concepts, it is certainly deplorable that Hartmann has nowhere taken the trouble to define them.

We have touched upon his methodological errors, which were serious enough, as they led to an inestimable waste of time and ink; fortunately they are not fundamental, for such premises as his scientific learning (right or wrong) could not supply, the gradual development of his thought surreptitiously smuggled into the system. A critic of infinite patience could probably locate the exact page and line where the stage direction should read: "enter from the wings, postulate no.so-and-so." But in spite of all these failings, which account in large measure for Hartmann's bad repute among the hard-headed "Zunftphilosophen", there is a profound idea to be found under his futile polemics and impossible dialectics, "if men would knowingly distil it out." The idea which he fondly considers the result of laborious "induction", although it was, in truth, his original philosophic "hunch", is the saving grace of his philosophy; I mean, of course, the term: Unconscious Mind.

II

Of Hartmann's Light: the Notion of "Unconscious Mind."

The most profitable source of information about Hartmann's philosophical light is his first book, "die Philosophie des Unbewussten." In this work the author, not yet encumbered with too much dialectic metaphysics, approaches experience in the new light of his inspiration as a sane philosopher should do, and forthwith interprets all his knowledge of nature, art, history or what not in terms of the new idea. Some of these interpretations are of striking aptitude -- in fact, are almost inescapable. Others are a bit strained, neither compelling nor quite incredible; and some, unfortunately, are pressed into service by utterly unconstitutional means. Thus his notion (I purposely use so vague and non-committal a term) commands at once the critic's interest, yet arouses suspicion. We are tempted to believe that Unconscious Mind is neither a chimeara, as his adversaries claim, nor, as he himself would have us believe, an ontological principle. What, then, is it? Let us test the first alternative: does the term mean anything at all?

Hartmann's doctrine of the Unconscious might be briefly formulated as follows:

In our own impulses, in organic nature, and perhaps even in the events of the inorganic world, we meet constantly with phenomena that seem to follow a deep-laid plan, yet are not related to any consciousness which could have conceived this plan. We perform useful acts before we are aware of our purpose. Our organs are adapted to their functions, but were certainly not consciously designed by us or our progenitors. Therefore, if we are not to allow impossible proportions to the powers of

of coincidence, we must assume that there is principle in nature which serves as a cause for certain intelligent acts not involving consciousness, just as a mental image (*bewusste Vorstellung*) serves as a cause for our conscious acts. For lack of a better term, Hartmann calls this principle an unconscious image (*unbewusste Vorstellung*).*

The analogy between conscious purpose and unconscious teleology holds still further. In a teleological event as well as in a premeditated action, there is a dynamic factor, i.e. a reaction of a body (in the broadest sense) to the "image." Now, unconscious matter reacts to this x called the "unconscious image" as our body reacts to the image in consciousness; in short, there are cases of anticipatorily guided motions which do not involve consciousness.

The assumption of such an x certainly helps to interpret a great many phenomena of nature which have troubled philosophy since its beginnings. Socrates was astounded at the mysterious working of his "Daemon;" ** Kant discovered that he often reacted as to a mental image, where no conscious image could be found, and expressed his surprise at the small portion of our mind that is "illuminated."*** This reaction to a yet

p. 131,

Arthur Drews, in Hartmanns philosophisches System im Grundriss, gives the following definition: "Wenn Hartmann von einer unbewussten Vorstellung spricht, so bezeichnet er damit eine ausserhalb des Bewusstseins fallende und dennoch nicht wesensfremde Ursache gewisser Vorgänge, die mit demjenigen, was uns im Bewusstsein als Vorstellung bekannt ist, das gemein hat das sie, wie diese, einen idealen Inhalt besitzt."

**Plato, Apology, 31 "You have often heard me speak of an oracle or sign which comes to me, and is the divinity which Melotus ridicules in the indictment. This sign I have had ever since I was a child." (Cf. also the Memorabilia of Xenophon and the dialogues on poetic inspiration.)

*** Immanuel Kant, Anthropologie I, "Von den Vorstellungen die wir haben, ohne uns ihrer bewusst zu sein.": "Dass gleichsam auf der grossen Karte unseres Gemüts nur wenig Stellen illuminirt sind: kann uns Bewunderung über unser eigenes Wesen einflössen."

inexistent constellation of events -- inexistent even as content of consciousness -- is the key-note in such puzzles as instinct, adaptation, genius (the Daemon of Socrates.).

But the Unconscious seems to Hartmann something more than this x; he could not view it merely as a stimulus to which matter reacts, because he was not in the habit of treating mental images or sensations, the prototypes of his unconscious image, as stimuli for organic matter. To him, mental images were stimuli for mental activity, i.e. for the will, not for the body. This helps to account for his complicated metaphysics; for in order to preserve the resemblance between the relation image - will and that of unconscious-image - nature, the last term, nature, had to be interpreted in terms analogous to will.

The groundwork in this direction had been done by Arthur Schopenhauer. He had explored the possibilities of treating will as "vital impulse," force as a case of this impulse, and extension as an instance of force.* But whereas a vital impulse such as Bergson's Elan Vital can be thought practically without further determination -- or, in the language of Hartmann, without specific content, (by analogy not to a particular plan or wish, but to a vague feeling of desire), Schopenhauer's language forestalls this interpretation, although I believe it was just this "feeling of desire" that inspired his notion. Will, as Hartmann points out, must have an object, a definite content. Otherwise it is an abstraction. This object, then, is either a mental image as in the personal, "phenomenal" will, or it is an "unconscious" image, which guides the development of an organism, the evolution of the inorganic world, or the spontaneous creation of the tranced or sleeping brain, without ever appearing as a content of any consciousness.

*Arthur Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille u. Vorstellung, Bk II
P* Phil.d.Unbewusstsein, I, p. 101: Ein Wille der nicht Etwas will, ist nicht; nur
.....Daher: KEIN WOLLEN OHNE VORSTELLUNG.

Thus Hartmann wipes out the Schopenhauerian distinction between will and image, which claims that these two are of different spheres, the one transcendental, the other phenomenal.* Taken separately, these are indeed abstractions; collectively, they are the Unconscious, which an unsympathetic critic characterized as "Hartmann's maid-of-all-work."**

The Unconscious is a new name for the teleological principle in nature -- a principle which has long been discussed, although its philosophical formulation has invariably led to inconsistencies. It has been asserted by the religious as an unfailing Providence, which marks the sparrows fall and keeps track of every hair on every head. It has been set up as Etelechy*** and as Causa finalis, with innumerable variations and modifications. It has been ^{just as} vehemently denied, as "human figments"†† and "empty concepts,"‡‡

*Schopenhauer, Op. cit. p. 131: "Alle Vorstellung, welcher Art sie auch sei, alles Objekt, ist Erscheinung. Ding an sich ist allein der Wille: als solcher ist er durchaus nicht Vorstellung, sondern toto genere von ihr verschieden."

** J.C.Fischer, Op.cit., p. 25

***Aristotle, De Anima, Bk.II Cf. also R. Eisler, Philosophen-Lexikon, Article "Aristoteles": "Die Seele ist Ursache und Prinzip des lebenden Körpers, auch Ziel und Zweck desselben, denn alle natürlichen Körper sind Werkzeuge der Seele; die Körper der Pflanzen und Tiere sind nur wegen der Seele da."

†Cf Thomas Aquinas: "Omne agens in agendo intendit finem."

††Spinoza, Ethics, I, XXVI, app. "There is no need to show at length, that nature has no particular goal in view, and that final causes are mere human figments."

††† Büchner, Kraft und Stoff, p. 27: "Die heutige Naturforschung hat sich von diesen leeren und nur die Oberfläche der Dinge beschauenden Zweckmäßigkeitsgriffen ziemlich allgemein emanzipiert."

Since neither of these viewpoints has won a definite victory over its opponent, or even remained in power for any length of term, Hartmann does not convince the world of anything when he sells himself soul and body to one of the two hostile factions. "Everything that occurs, occurs with absolute Wisdom absolutely according to design."* By such an utterance, of course, our hero assumes the burden of the proof. His philosophy of the Unconscious is constructed to bear this burden; but despite all Schopenhauerian scaffoldings and Hegelian props, despite all "scientific" ramifications, it is rather a slender and ethereal structure, this notion of unconscious mind, to hold the cosmos up!

Abstracting, or rather extricating, the Unconscious from its monstrously hybrid, post-Kantian-post-Baconian camouflage, we find it a fairly new, promising, philosophic idea; such as I have tried to state in the preceding pages. Let us sum up the given premises:

1. A purposive event implies a final cause.
2. A final cause is a future event.
3. A future event cannot itself be efficient in the present.
4. The efficient cause of a purposive event is an image of the final cause.
5. Images are not physical existents.
6. Images in the accepted sense are noitents of some consciousness.**
7. There are purposive events which do not involve consciousness.

Hartmann, it must be remembered, claims to have used for his premises only "facts gathered from Science."*** As the scientists of

*Phil. des Unbewussten, B, p. 344

**Cf. DeLecke, Essay on the Human Understanding, Bk. II, 11: "it being hard to conceive that anything should think and not be conscious of it."

***"Science appears to have meant for Hartmann: (1) Wagners Handwörterbuch der Physiologie, (2) J. Müller, Lehrbuch der Physiologie (3) Valentin, Lehrbuch der Physiologie, (4) Burdach, Lehrbuch der Physiologie. He deplores that for the support of certain theories he was "actually compelled" to use antiquated sources, because new sources offered no such support.

of his day were sharply divided in their treatment of purposive events, and as most of them believed that a purposive event implied a lucky coincident of efficient, physical causes, the phrase "gathered from science" would certainly require a little modification to cover the first premise. This holds likewise for 2), as one could equally well gather from nineteenth-century science that "a final cause is a scholastic bogey." Number 3) would undoubtedly find enthusiastic support in the laboratories; 4), shorn of the phrase: "of the final cause," might be entertained by psychologists. 5) would be vehemently denied, because it is characteristic of scientists to confound phenomena with their supposed causes. 6) certainly passed for a truism among the intellectuals of Hartmann's day; it is the only premise which he considers "unscientific," and disposes of as a mere vulgar prejudice. 7) could be strictly accepted, especially by those who considered purposive events as coincidences of the mechanical world order. Whether there be any purposive events, in either sense, is truly for scientists (including historians) to ascertain.

As a matter of fact, the first six of these postulates serve simply to define the sense in which "purposive event" is used by those who use it at all; more especially, the sense in which Hartmann uses it. The seventh postulate, on the other hand, is the one that really interests him. That is the torch to his bonfire. It is, notably, the only existence-postulate in his set, and as such it bears the responsibility for the truth, as opposed to the mere consistency, of his system. For if the propositions defining "purposive events" be free from contradiction, the philosophy of the unconscious is valid for a possible world of purposive nature; but to make it appropriate to the actual world, we need the premise that such events really exist, and this is the message of the seventh proposition.

The validity of this assertion is, of course, dependent upon our scientific knowledge of fact, and this is the circumstance which has led Hartmann and his adherents to the belief that the whole system is derived from Science.

The significance of Hartmann's philosophy lies chiefly in a theorem which follows from 4), 6) and 7): namely, that there are some images which are not "images in the accepted sense." These are not contents of any consciousness. Neither are they physical things (by postulate 5). They are designated as unconscious images (unbewusste Vorstellungen).

It is not contrary to either nineteenth or twentieth century usage to classify all phenomena as either physical or mental. Now, unconscious images are not physical; ergo, they are mental. They are contents of mind, but not of consciousness.

At this point, the bonfire is burning nicely. It is consuming two-and-a-half centuries of good Cartesianism. Res Cogitans is flaring sky-high -- so Hartmann tries to add Res Extensa by way of more fuel. Unfortunately Res Extensa does not prove to be combustible, and his world-illuminating beacon forthwith takes on the appearance of a general smudge.

III.

The Quagmire of "Res Cogitans".

When Descartes divided all things that exist into Res Extensa and Res Cogitans, he prepared the ground for a record-breaking harvest of confusions.* The source of these philosophical deviltries lies in what must have appeared to their unwitting author as a slight inelegance of definition; namely, the fact that Res Cogitans and Res Extensa are not formal contradictories. Unfortunately, logic has more to do with philosophy than is commonly supposed, and logical fallacies are productive of metaphysical ones. Let us examine the evidence against Descartes.

Res Cogitans, it is tacitly assumed, equals Res Inextensa; and Res Extensa equals Res Incogitans. Consequently posterity has taken for granted that Mind, which is generally agreed to be inextended, is conscious; and that everything unconscious is extended, i.e. is "physical."

The laws which govern matter are simple enough to bring a few of them within our grasp. We know enough about them to believe that they are complete, that the behaviour of matter is nowhere left to caprice. We can construct a logical system which is roughly descriptive of physical nature, and presumably the ideal perfection of such a system would make it exactly descriptive.

Whenever we understand any event, we are seeing that event as content, whole or partial, of some logical system. In so far as it transcends the system, we do not understand it; toward this baffling portion we take either of two attitudes -- that of the ignoramus, or

*R.F.A.Hoernle, Studies in Contemp. Metaphysics, p.241: "As far as any single thinker can be called so, he is the father of all evil in modern philosophy."

that of the mystic; the pre-scientific or the anti-scientific attitude. Now, it is theoretically possible to understand Res Extensa in terms of a rational system. We naturally expect to find Res Inextensa equally tractable, and boldly declare psychology a possible science. Psychology, true to the Cartesian maldefinition, undertook to study the structure of consciousness. The model system was that which served for physical science -- a system whose terms were in unbroken relation with one another, without interpolation of any foreign terms. But the impossibility of applying such a system soon became apparent. The events of "consciousness" occurred without any discoverable law of sequence. Moreover, the interpolation of certain terms from the physical system -- events in the unconscious, extended world -- was found to bridge the gaps. Nothing more natural than to combine the two orders, to incorporate the obstreperous one in the unbroken, tidy system of matter!

But "matter" was already a complete system. There were no gaps to be filled with terms from "consciousness." Where ever such a term sought entrance, there was one and just one already supplied -- in the jargon of psychology, for every psychosis there was a neurosis.* Thus the psychological order was left in the air, a useless, incomplete, astral body of the physical system. That is the history of parallelism and epiphenomenalism.

There are two general ways out of this dilemma: one, to ignore the spectral counterpart -- that is the policy of the behaviorists in psychology and the materialists in philosophy; The other, to claim that both systems are closed, that the psychical is less simple, yet no less perfect a system as the physical, and that either (1) they

*Cf. R. Herbart, Bewusstsein u. Unbewusstes, p. 163: "Wenn es wahr ist, dass die Reihe der physischen Erscheinungen eine kausal in sich geschlossene ist, dann kann nicht ihr Zusammenhang dadurch unterbrochen werden, dass sie, in Gestalt rein mechanischer, physiologischer Assoziationsglieder unmittelbar in die psychische Kausalreihe hineingreift."

have certain common or at least parallel terms, or (2) that they show a perfect one-one correlation throughout -- are, in other words, entirely interchangeable, two possible contents of one logical structure. (1) is the theory of interactionism, spiritualism and common-sense. (2) is the basis of all philosophies which try to interpret mind as a function of matter, or matter as a function of mind, or both as functions of some "neutral stuff." (Here it might be remarked that "neutral stuff" is simply a bad name for the abstract logical form. "Stuff" is a content, and as such is unambiguous, and "neutral" in this connection means ambiguous. The form is the neutral element.)

None of the attempted solutions has been satisfactory. To ignore anything as familiar and real as the distinction between the conscious and the unconscious, mind and nature, is simply to hide one's head like the ostrich and refuse to see the unpleasant. On the other hand, to assert dogmatically that the psychic system is a closed one does not convince the opposition; if anyone chooses to contradict this assertion with just as much of dogmatism, the decisive factor in the debate can only be lung-power. And finally, a successful reduction of mind to matter, or vice versa, or of everything to neutral stuff, leaves us still with the problem of a very remarkable illusion -- namely, the illusion that there be two orders, mind and matter, which seem to differ in all their unreal attributes and make-believe behavior. This is the state in which the subject has been left by the idealists, and by such empiricists as Avenarius, Mach, James, Holt, and Russell.

It is a remarkable fact that in many of these interpretations, Consciousness -- the ear-mark of Res Cogitans -- has been entirely neglected. Mind is defined in terms of the "outer world", and Consciousness is once more the neurologists epiphenomenon, or is denied even this

humble back-seat and unceremoniously "explained away."

"Psychology without a soul" has proved rather a successful branch of physiology. It is perhaps our best psychology. But to ignore Consciousness has, of course, not done away with that disconcerting factor, and psychology without a soul simply implies philosophy with something else.* We have the fact, or phenomenon, or illusion of Res Inextensa, and willy nilly we must fit it into some system or declare ourselves bankrupt -- i.e., mystics. "Consciousness" is not matter. But it is something. And we believe that every existent thing is subject to some so there must be at least one complete system in which conscious elements are neither insufficient nor superfluous, but are exactly necessary and sufficient terms. Any such system is Res Cogitans, or Mind. Now, Mind is not a coherent sequence of conscious "states" or "ideas", for we know that these do not occur in such sequence.** This difficulty in ordering the elements of consciousness has given rise to Hartmann's theory of Unconscious Mind, which in its turn has blessed philosophy with an unparalleled heritage of paradoxes, antinomies and absurdities. Yet Hartmann is a revolutionary in the right direction with respect to at least one philosophical evil: he has called attention once and for all to the neglected ontological possibility (which, as a matter of fact, contains our desired solution, though not as he thought) -- "Inextensa Res non Cogitans."

*R.F.A.Hoernle, Op. cit. p. 208-209: "When James puts the question, 'Does consciousness exist?' and answers at first, 'there is no such thing,' the setting of his answer lies in the 'such'. For his second answer is another theory of consciousness."

** R. Herberth, Op.cit. p. 115: "Die Tatsache des Auftretens und Wiederverschwindens von Bewusstsein nötigt uns also, wann und wo auch immer sie uns entgegentritt, zu der Annahme einer über den Rahmen des Bewusstseins selbst hinausliegenden, psychischen Wirklichkeit, d.h. zu der Hypothese des Unbewussten!"

IV

"Inextensa Res Non Cogitans;"

Metaphysical Alarums and the Freudian Excursion.

Between the Lockian psychology and epistemology of Consciousness and the psychology and metaphysics of Unconsciousness, there is an ambiguous conception, more closely related to classical British than to present continental thought; that is the pseudo-consciousness called "Peripheral," "subliminal," or the "lower level." It is the same thing as Leibnitz's "petits perceptions," and is distinguished by Freud from the Unconscious, under the name of "Foreconscious." It is not in any sense the concept of Unconscious Mind, because it simply involves less of consciousness, not more of something else, than ordinary focal perception. Therefore we may debar it entirely from our discussion of Unconsciousness in the Hartmannian sense -- despite the fact that Hartmann himself traces the origins of his idea to Leibnitz.**

The Unconscious of Hartmann looks very much like the Fichtean Ego, the Hegelian Idea, the Schopenhauerian Will and the Bergsonian Vital Impulse.*** Not that it coincides with any of these cosmic principles; but it is of their distinguished company in so far as it is another cosmic principle.

*Jung adds to the confusion of tongues by using this word in the sense of Freud's Unconscious, and adding another version of Unconscious called the superpersonal Unconscious.

**Philosophie des Unbewussten, p.15: "Ich bekenne freudig, dass die Lectüre des Leibnitz es war, was mich zuerst zu den hier niedergelegten Untersuchungen angeregt hat."

*** Dwelshauvers, L'Inconscient, p.11 "Hartmann ne s'est pas limité à l'inconscient psychologique; il a essayé de le rattacher à une activité

Yet among all the pretenders to world-power, it has enjoyed a remarkable distinction: a certain school of psychologists has snatched it up. It is true that all psycho-analysts repudiate Hartmann as an academic, speculative, useless metaphysician; which he was. But it is equally true that-- if we keep faithfully to the Philosophy of the Unconscious, and forget these cherished elaborations of later years-- the descriptions of Unconscious Mind given by the Freudian writers tally with those of the discredited philosopher. He goes beyond them in ascribing such Mind to Nature as well as to Man, but that is beside the point at issue, which is: what is characteristic of the Unconscious?

Probably very few people are familiar with the theoretical writings of the psychoanalysts. This is not to be regretted, since these gentlemen have not, to my knowledge, produced any pure theory that is worth a normal adult's time to read. Knowing little about logical systems and caring less, they have, for the most part, avowedly kept away from metaphysical discussion. * For the most part, their doctrines do not even approximate conceptual, i.e. philosophical formulation -- let alone systematization. But they do occasionally indulge in general comment, and from such passages it behooves us to form a composite picture of the Unconscious.

* C.G.Jung, The Theory of Psychoanalysis p.56: "For us, the Unconscious is not an entity, but a term, about whose metaphysical entity we do not permit ourselves to form any idea."

S.Freud, Traumdeutung, p. 380: "Das Unbewusste ist das eigentlich reale Psychische, uns nach seiner inneren Natur so unbekannt wie das Reale der Aussenwelt, und uns durch die Daten des Bewusstseins ebenso unvollständig gegeben wie die Aussenwelt durch die Angaben unserer Sinnesorgane."

R.Herbertz, Op.cit. p.222: "Die Einzelwissenschaft bildet sich, solange sie pflichtgemäss auf dem ihr zugehörigen Boden verbleibt, über das transzendente Wesen der Dinge überhaupt keine Vorstellung."

Hartmann describes the Unconscious somewhat as follows: "the Unconscious" is a collective name for unconscious Will (Schopenhauer) and unconscious Idea. These two factors can exist only in conjunction; they are only abstractly separable. Every volition involves a goal, it must be directed toward something. As this something is not yet physically actual, it cannot per se determine volition; for only an existent factor can enter into causal relation. It must then be present in some non-physical form. Hartmann assumes that non-physical implies mental, i.e. that what is non-physical is an idea in a mind. If, however, we are not conscious of the goal of some of our volitions, then we must have an unconscious mind. This unconscious mind Hartmann conceives on the analogy of Schopenhauer's unconscious Will -- in us, yet transcending us -- an eternal, indivisible, cosmic Activity; but instead of letting this Activity loose in chaos, to will, but will nothing special, do, but do nothing special, he considers it eternally directed toward realizing its ideas -- its unconscious images. This Mind appears in every individual as his Unconscious, i.e. it condescends to act in specific instances, to direct individual movements and carry out personal desires. Thus we are justified in speaking of Unconscious Mind in general, and of Mr. Smith's or Miss Jones' unconscious mind in particular.*

The Unconscious never errs, never sickens, never wearies. It is timeless, hence immortal.** Above all, it is ever active, and its whole

*Note: Miss Jones is a greater share-holder than Mr. Smith. See Phil. des Unbewussten, p. 359.

** Hartmann, like many philosophers and all non-philosophers, uses these words interchangeably, and proves the immortality of the World-Soul by pointing out its extra-temporal nature, just as Hugo Münsterberg in his essay Eternal Life proves the immortality of the human soul.

activity is volition. Its ideas are determined by the true interests of the individual, and its desire is to express these ideas in terms of conscious, sensory images; the image which results in consciousness is not, however, necessarily a copy of the respective unconscious idea.

Such are the manifestations of the Unconscious in the human mind. This part of the doctrine has been taken up by a certain school of modern psychiatrists, although the relationship has been consistently and even passionately disowned. The rest of Hartmann's philosophy, that which Freud and his collaborators really mean to reject, is esoteric, being inaccessible to all but the most idealistic, voluntaristic, pseudo-scientific or metaphysicians. It is the prototype of Bergson's elan vital and other popular forms of mysticism. Nevertheless, the psychoanalysts cannot keep away from the treacherous deeps, and they have had several falls from grace. Let us see how Hartmann's thesis tallies with theirs. The easiest means of comparison is, perhaps, to hold a symposium where these gentlemen shall speak for themselves, under the chairmanship of Mr. v. Hartmann:

1. "The Unconscious cannot sicken, but consciousness can sicken when its material organs are disturbed."*

"It is quite true that our unconscious desires are ever active.... In fact, it is a striking peculiarity of unconscious processes, that they are indestructible."**

"The respect which was accorded to dreams by the nations of old is a psychologically well-founded honor done to the untrammelled, indestructible part of the human soul, which produces the dream-volition, and which we recognize in our Unconscious."

*Phil. des Unb. Vol. II p. 3

**S. Freud, Traumdeutung, p. 384

***Ibid. p. 409 (*Italics mine.*)

2. "The Unconscious cannot weary, but every conscious activity must weary.....the Unconscious does not falter or doubt the Unconscious cannot err."*

"The paling of memories and the weakness of impressions no longer recent, these are really secondary changes, wrought by tiresome labor; it is the Foreconscious which performs this labor."**

"Conscious, directed thought works for communication through verbal elements, and is difficult and exhausting; unconscious, imaginative thought, on the other hand, works without effort, one might say spontaneously, through reminiscences."***

"When he (Hartmann) tells us, for example, that the Unconscious does not doubt, does not err, does not weary, what does this involve but to exaggerate an exact observation, even that which Beaunis elsewhere reports, concerning the ease of unconscious mental labor and the services it renders to those who know how to employ it?"†

3. "The thinking of the Unconscious, aside from the apparent world and its manifestations in that realm, is indeed not only timeless, but beyond time.....herewith we would seem to have conceived the Unconscious as the metaphysically valid side of Kant's intelligible world."††

"We have learned that the Unconscious processes per se are 'timeless'. This means that they are not arranged in a temporal order, that time does not affect them, that the notion of time cannot be

*Phil. des Unb. Vol. II pp.3-7

**S. Freud, Traumdeutung, p. 384

*** J. Varendonck, Über das Vorbewusste Phantasierende Denken, p.2

† G. Dwelshauvers, L'Inconscient, p.378

†† Phil. des Unb.

p applied to them..... Our abstract idea of time seems rather to be derived from the perception-consciousness system and to refer to this system's apprehension of itself."*

"The Unconscious has no knowledge of past and future."**

4. "We find it very plausible that the Unconscious Will, directly related as it is to the Unconscious Idea, consists of nothing but the desire to realize its unconscious idea, if we mean by 'realization' manifestation in the real world, in this case: immediate manifestation as sensible image in consciousness."***

"We have accepted the explanation, that a dream is always a wish-fulfillment, because it is a product of the system Ubw. (the Unconscious), which has no other goal for its labors than wish-fulfillment and commands no other forces than those of Desire.....The reappearance (in Consciousness) of a perception is the wish-fulfillment."†

"The Unconscious....has itself no other aim than to break through the weight of repression to a manifestation in consciousness or overt action."‡

5. "The Unconscious Image is something generically distinct from that which appears in consciousness as conception or inspiration of the Unconscious."††

*S. Freud, Jenseits des Lustprinzips, p. 25

**J. Varendonck, Op.cit. p. 128

***Phil. des Unb. II 13

† S. Freud, Traumdeutung, pp. 376-378

†- S. Freud, Jenseits des Lustprinzips, p. 16

†† Phil. des Unb. II 13

"We know that the symptom (manifestation in consciousness) is a substitute for something that was prevented by repression."*

6. "Anything that Consciousness can do, can also be done by the Unconscious, even better, more quickly and more precisely."**

"All those ~~thought-processes~~ ^{thought-processes} we value highly in our thought-processes, by which these are distinguished as complicated products of a high order, are found again in the dream-processes. ... If we are to see anything in this circumstance, it is the proof of the thesis that the most complicated thought-sequences are possible without the collaboration of Consciousness."***

"The Unconscious is forever active and produces combinations of its materials that serve future determinations. It produces subliminal, prospective combinations, as well as our Consciousness, save that they excell the conscious combinations in precision and scope."†

7. "That all instincts, with few exceptions, serve the chief purposes of Nature, self-preservation and race-preservation, cannot be denied."††

"Our point of view was dualistic from the beginning and is more so to-day than ever, since we call the contrary impulses no longer self- and sex-impulses, (self and race), but will to life and will to death."†††

*S. Freud, Einführung in die Psychoanalyse, p. 338 (italics mine)

**Phil. des Unb. I p. 356

***~~Phil. des Unb. I~~ p. 356

*** S. Freud, Traumdeutung, p. 394

†G. Jung, Theorie der Unbewussten Prozesse, p. 133

†† Phil. des Unb. I

††† S. Freud, Jenseits des Lustprinzips.

Freud himself is struck by the similarity of his speculative results with the Schopenhauerian philosophy;*he does not, perhaps, realize that the central concept which distinguishes his doctrine from classical voluntarism is his acceptance of unconscious images. Herein also lies the crucial difference between Schopenhauer and Hartmann, and despite his own remonstrances, Freud appears to stand nearer to the latter metaphysician than to the former.

The great point of divergence between Hartmann and the psychoanalysts lies not in the concept of the Unconscious -- their agreement on that subject is, I think, strikingly enough set forth by the above compendium of opinions -- but in their remoter speculations concerning its origin and its sphere of operation. Hartmann assumes it as his first principle, and applies it to everything without ~~paraphrase~~; the more cautious scientists prefer to derive it from the natural world, instead of vice versa, and limit its scope to the human world -- yet even in this respect, Freud's derivation of Consciousness from the Unconscious,** and Jung's theory which traces the Unconscious back to the first forms of life;***make the all-important distinction appear as one of degree rather than of kind.

Thus it would seem as though the foundations of Hartmann's philosophy and Freud's must stand or fall together, by the same critique. I do not mean to imply that Freud's psychology must

*S. Freud, Jenseits des Lustprinzips, p.49: "Aber etwas anderes können wir uns nicht verhehlen, dass wir unversehens in den Hafen der Philosophie Schopenhauers eingelaufen sind, für den ja der Tod 'das eigentliche Resultat' und insofern der Zweck des Lebens ist, der Sexualtrieb aber die Verkörperung des Willens zum Leben."

**Cf. Jenseits des Lustprinzips, Ch. IV

***Cf. Die Psychologie der Unbewussten Prozesse, Chapter I, Die Dominanten des Ueberpersönlichen Unbewussten."

share this fate; that is a very different affair, an empirical and not a logical one. To consider psychoanalysis discredited because the theory of Unconscious Mind is untenable, would be like condemning the useful and respectable art of engineering on the discovery of a fallacy in Euclidean geometry or Newtonian physics. The validity of Freud's psychiatry does not concern us here.

Concerning unconscious images, Hartmann can give us ^{only} ~~ne~~ ~~ative~~ information. ~~negative information.~~ He states his dilemma perfectly when he says "that conscious mind simply never can imagine how the unconscious images are given, it can only negatively know that they are not given in any way which it can imagine."*

Freud is hardly more explicit; he cannot tell us what he means by "unconscious image", but insists that he means something, and that our failure to see that this something is logically possible, simply implies that we are not thinking about the same kind of something. The something works; therefore it must exist. What he fails to see is that it must exist as something -- but not necessarily as anything that merits the name of Unconscious Mind. Any critique directed against him would, of course, merely claim that "unconscious mind" is a misnomer, and connotes contradictory predicates, not that it fails to denote any subject whatever.

The psychoanalysts feel the inconsistency implied by the term "unconscious image", but do not feel inclined to press the matter. Their usual defense is, that the critics have produced the difficulty by arbitrarily defining image or idea (Vorstellung) as something in consciousness, thus deliberately and maliciously

*Phil. des Unbewussten, II, 5. "Superiorer wie hier stets mit einem grossen x, welches man in jene neue Formel mit hinein nehmen."

making "unconscious image" a contradictio in adjecto. But the defendants fail to give us any other definition;* at best they point out certain events "which no one will deny to be psychic,"** but give us no standard to measure what shall be called "psychic," and no reason why these events are necessarily subsumed under that heading. Since "Vorstellung" is simply not defined by them at all, the reader cannot but accept the current common-sense definition, which happens to define idea or image as ~~that which~~ ~~is present to the consciousness.~~ help starting out with such definitions as general usage has given to our vocabulary, and keeping these definitions until specific new meanings are assigned. Now the Hartmannian (and Freudian) meaning of "image" is certainly new, but unfortunately it is not specific.

Not only psychologists, but also several philosophers have attempted to show that Mind may be regarded as a closed system, by appealing to the novel entity (or big X) the Unconscious. But when thinkers interested in logical coherence rather than in psychotherapy pay court to that veiled divinity, then the trouble begins to brew. Unconscious images inevitably go by the board. They simply cannot be maintained in the dry light of logic, unless it be logic of the patented German type which Hartmann commanded.

Dwelshauvers, whose logic is of the international kind, has had to sacrifice the "ideal content" before he could accept the Unconscious at all.

"An idea," he writes, "does not exist except at the moment when I think it; actual thought is just the defining characteristic of an idea; undoubtedly, it (the idea) derives a good deal of

*S. Freud, *Jenseits des Lustpr.*; "So operieren wir hier stets mit einem grossen X, welches wir in jede neue Formel mit hinübernehmen."

its being from the Unconscious, but in order to be strictly speaking an idea, or representation, it must appear in consciousness.....Unconscious ideas or representations are really contradictory terms."*

Of course one is immediately tempted to ask: what, then, is left of the Unconscious? To which his answer is: "that which remains in the dynamic ~~but~~ unconscious state is the tendency to form ideas."**

Very well! We have reduced the Unconscious to a complex of tendencies; as such it might be identified with the Schopenhauerian Unconscious Will, save that M.Dwelshauvers --quite arbitrarily --resents any metaphysical aspersions upon his dicta. Yet he tells us that these tendencies, which he calls the Unconscious, "subsist, alive, in every one of us".*How can we help comparing them, then, to the "individualized impulses" of Schopenhauer?

A much more radical departure is that of Richard Herbertz. He does not even leave us the dynamic element. ~~For~~ he says:

"Concerning the Unconscious,....we may not speak of sensations, perception, memories or abstract ideas, not of feelings or volitions, and consequently not of an unconscious reaction to these psychic contents."

Here the Unconscious seems indeed like the gorgeous robe of the fairy-tale king, but Professor Herbertz refuses to be the enfant terrible who announced the fact that the king was walking in negligee. If we really press ~~him~~ the inquiry what the Unconscious is, he replies: "a postulate."

*G.Dwelshauvers, L'Inconscient, p.118

**Op.cit. p.119

***Loc.cit.

* R.Herbertz, Bewusstsein und Unbewusstes, p.199

Now this carries the scientist's right of hypothesis one point too far. To ask of the gentle reader that he should accept a postulate concerning a nonentity* which has no qualities** and only one property -- viz., that of "being psychic" -- is to impose unduly upon his gentleness. We cannot postulate pure nonsense, and escape the consequent logical absurdities by calling every definition of our new creation "metaphysical" and refusing on principle to worry about it. "Especially an Unconscious which plays a big part in a causal nexus cannot be denied the dignity of a psychic entity. The use of substantive adjectives such as "the Unconscious," "the Psychic," does not obviate the fact that we are postulating terms, which deserve to be conceived just as definitely as those denoted by unmitigated nouns.***

*R. Herbertz, Op.cit., p. 120: Herbertz is emphatic on this point; the Unconscious is not an entity. It does not exist. "Es ist jedoch hier die dringende Warnung angebracht, in jenem Unbewussten, in das wir das Bewusstsein vergehend denken, irgend eine reale, transzendentale, metaphysische Gegebenheit zu sehen. Solche Annahmen haben in der psychologischen Deutung der Tatsachen keinen Platz."

Yet this Unconscious must be postulated; we read on p. 230, "Unbewusste psychische Bedingungen bewussten Geisteslebens werden eben gerade so sicher stets postuliert werden müssen, als sie -- wegen ihres transzendenten Charakters -- stets ihrer Natur nach unbekannt bleiben werden."

** Op.cit., p. 188: "Das Unbewusste ist qualitätslos."

*** On this point (though on very few others) I agree perfectly with the sentiment expressed by Knight Dunlap in Mysticism, Freudianism and Scientific Psychology; here he quotes a passage from Hinkle's introduction to Jung's Psychology of the Unconscious Processes: "This term 'Unconscious' is used very loosely in Freudian psychology, and is not intended to invoke any academic discussion but to conform strictly to the dictionary classification of a negative concept which can neither be described nor defined," to which he adds the foot-note: "'Academic' is the term usually applied by tender-minded theorizers to the practical logicians who try to pin them down to a definite meaning."

It certainly appears upon reflection that "unconscious ideas" are self-contradictory, and that Unconscious Mind without this "ideal factor" is -- at best -- the blind Will of Schopenhauer, or -- at worst -- an empty phrase. But with the latter interpretation Herbertz seems to stand alone. Hartmann was well aware of employing two abstract notions, unconscious Will and unconscious Idea, which he conceived as appearing in reality always together, and which therefore he denoted collectively as the Unconscious. The Psychoanalysts, notably Freud* and Jung,** betray their relationship to him by emphasizing the dynamic character of their fundamental concept. Dwelshauvers distinguishes what seems to him the correct meaning of the Unconscious from all incorrect ones by calling the former the dynamic Unconscious;*** and it is he who really grasps the significance of the ~~nter~~nter, through its evolution.

"We shall soon see," he very aptly remarks, "how the notion of activity, coupled with the notion of reason, involves necessarily the notion of the Unconscious."† Conscious elements in any order whatever would not get us into difficulty; it is the concept of activity that starts the ball rolling.

*Cf. his constant references throughout the work: Jenseits des Lustprinzips to the Unconscious as "impulses". -- "die sogenannten Triebe des Organismus das wichtigste wie das dunkelste Element der psychologischen Forschung." (p.32)

**Cf. his generalized use of the dynamic concept of libido,

*** Dwelshauvers, Op.cit. p.112: "L'Inconscient Dynamique: Sous cette denomination generale, nous entendons toutes les formes d'activite inconsciente qui, a l'etat normal, exercent une influence sur notre mentalite."

† Op.cit. p.343

What Dwelshauvers does not recognize, however, is the historical significance of the Unconscious. It marks an inevitable epoch in the young science of psychology, an epoch which corresponds to that of the nineteenth century in physics and the philosophy based on physics. Hartmann's unconscious Image and unconscious Will are parallel's to Büchner's force and matter; his Unconscious, i.e. the Reality wherein these two principles can occur only in combination, is the exact counterpart to the physical Reality to which Büchner's slogan refers: "No force without matter -- no Matter without force!"

Hartmann is perfectly conscious of this relationship, and is happy in the conviction that it proves Büchner's universe to be a mere sub-species of his own. * He accepted the physics in question, and sublimated the notion of force to that of activity, the expression of the Will; for "willing is activity itself." **

Physics has pretty well outgrown the force-and-matter stage, (going through the monistic stage of expressing matter in terms of force) but psychology has just grown into it. Physics has discarded its mystic "postulates" because it has discovered formulae which could describe its data without mentioning matter and force. Let us see whether the Unconscious, (having duly received the monistic treatment by Dwelshauvers), is not ready for the logical junk-heap, and whether we cannot yet anticipate some formulae that shall have no need of it -- whether we are not able, at this stage, to acquire "new lamps for old."

*Hartmann, Grundriss der Naturphilosophie

**Hartmann, Grundriss der Psychologie, p.146

V

Cutting the Gordian Knot with Occam's Razor.

"Entia praeter necessitatem non sunt multiplicanda." Do we really need Unconscious Mind as "a large X which we take over into every new formula," or can we eliminate the unknown quantity by some new manipulation of our known quantities?

"Psychic" is an adjective which seems to apply (1) to the perceiving subject, (2) to the datum (not object) of perception, and (3) to the perception itself. Consciousness is psychic, its content is psychic, and its laws are psychic.

From the "laws of thought" in this psychological sense, it is only a step, through an unadmitted ambiguity in that phrase, to the "laws of thought" in the Boolean sense, i.e. the fundamentals of logic. Hegel took this step with characteristic subtlety. Kant had duly prepared the ground by treating the categories of experience as functions of the experiencing-relation, as laws of experienced Being qua experienced. From this Hegel infers that they depend on the mind, ergo belong to the mind, ergo are psychic (geistig). Having drawn this useful inference he rejects the premise, and henceforth treats the categories as laws of experienced Being qua Being. Consequently, since the categories are psychic and belong to Being, the psychic belongs to Being, i.e. all Being is psychic.

Hartmann's reasoning is ~~fundamentally~~ the same as this wonderful deduction, save that he enlivens the "spectral dance of bloodless categories" by filling the empty forms with Unconscious Will. Thus

he establishes that psychic Being which underlies yet "has" the categories, is rational, but not accessible to our reason, and consequently figures as a "large X" behind phenomenal Nature, or at least ~~vv~~ if we consider the modern modifications of the notion -- behind human Nature.

One difficulty in dealing with this persistent large X is, that it is not an "unknown quantity" in the logical or mathematical sense. There is an ambiguity in this expression; for the x of mathematics and logic is an undetermined, variable quantity, unknown in respect of its specific value, but not in respect of the kind of value it may assume. Jnaud's x stands for something logically inconsistent, som thing essentially unknowable, and therefore it is not the sort of x which may be confidently "carried over into every new formula." The symbolic language of mathematics has done much toward fixating and delimiting philosophic ideas, but in the hands of one who is unacquainted with (or forgetful of) its original uses it is a dangerous instrument, for its generality and abstractness can be made to cover ideas which are merely vague, i.e. not only indeterminate but indeterminable, and which henceforth put on the respectable appearance of Universals.*

*In Hartmann's Grundriss der Metaphysik there is a striking example of this abusive use of logical principles, viz. an appeal to the existence of disjunctive propositions as a justification of the free will. We read on p. 35: "Je verwickelter aber die Verhältnisse in der organischen Natur werden, desto häufiger werden die Fälle wo die formal-logische Notwendigkeit der mathematischen Determination bloss noch disjunktiv ist und für die Entscheidung zwischen den Möglichkeiten (in der Art und Weise der Kraftumformung) der teleologischen Determination den Spielraum frei lässt."

I would that he had given us at least one example of a disjunctive law which keeps its disjunctive character when applied to a specific situation!

As Dwelshauvers has pointed out, Unconscious Mind is a product of the notions activity and reason.^{*} The concept of activity I propose to shelve for the present. It is represented in Hartmann's writings as the Will,^{**} in Freud's as Impulses, in Dwelshauvers' as Living Tendencies. But wherever we find this metaphysical principle of force in the capacity of Unconscious Mind, it is coupled with the other Hartmannian element, namely idea, image, reason. This is the interesting factor, and is by no means as unanimously described as the activity-element. Its instances range from the very concrete "primitive images" (Urbilder) of Jung^{***} to the thoroughly formal "psychic conditions" of Herbertz.[†] Hartmann holds an ambiguous position; at one moment he speaks of "unconscious images", at the next of "logical determination of the Will", or "ideal content". Unfortunately the German word "ideal" lends itself equally well to translation as "ideal" or as "ideational", and I am not certain of his meaning, but suspect that he means sometimes the one and sometimes the other. His insistence on the timelessness of unconscious imagination (unbewusstes Vorstellen) certainly gives it a logical rather than a psychological connotation, and the conception of "implicit thinking" is very much like a psychologicistic interpretation of logical implication. It substitutes the deducibility for the deduction, but keeps the baggage of the temporal order for the non-temporal.

"Unconscious thinking summarizes all the stages of a process,

*Cf. supra p.31

**Phil. des Unbewussten II 15: "Wollen und Tätigsein sind demnach identische oder Wechselbegriffe."

***G. Jung, Op.cit. p.85: "Es giebt in jedem Einzelnen...die gro ßen 'urtümlichen' Bilder,...die potenziell in der Hirnstruktur vererbten Möglichkeiten menschlichen Vorstellens, wie es von jeher war."

†Herbertz, Op.cit. p.128.

reason and consequence, cause and effect, means and end, etc., in a single moment, and thinks them not before, beside or outside, but within the result itself, it thinks them in no other way than through the result. Therefore this thinking cannot be asserted as a discreet thinking outside of its result, it is rather implicit in the thought of the result, without ever being made explicit."*

Now, a factor which may be implicit in anything is certainly an ideal and not an ideational factor. Its nature is like that of an implied proposition, but to assume that some mind must be deducing what is implied, seems utterly gratuitous. "Unconscious thinking" in the above passage is simply not thinking at all, but thinkability, i.e. logical order.

Freud is even less precise than Hartmann in his use of language. He speaks constantly of conscious, subconscious and unconscious psychical systems; until he suddenly spoils the illusion by referring to them as neural and cerebral systems. They are not psychic at all! Deep into his work he has so far talked consistently of "the psychical mechanism, which...is given in the normal structure of the spiritual apparatus," and of "the two psychical systems," (i.e. subconscious and unconscious,)* he suddenly informs us that everything psychical is virtual, and the real systems are physical ones.†

*Phil. des Unb., II 15

**S. Freud, Traumdeutung, p. 399: "Soweit haben wir das Schema des psychischen Apparats bereits verfolgt...."

***Ibid. p. 405

Ibid. p. 407: "Alles, was Gegenstand unserer inneren Wahrnehmung werden kann, ist virtuell, wie das durch den Gang der Lichtstrahlen gegebene Bild im Fernrohre. Die Systeme aber, die selbst nichts Psychisches sind und nie unserer psychischen Wahrnehmung zugänglich werden, sind wir berechtigt anzunehmen gleich den Linsen des Fernrohres, die das Bild entwerfen."

† Loc. cit.: "Nicht das psychische Gebilde scheint uns als das Bewegliche, sondern dessen Innervation."

Hartmann and Freud, in their mystic rather than scientific moods, still ascribe to the Unconscious certain mental attributes -- imagining, wishing, scheming for desired ends. But Herbertz deprives it of all these claims to psychism. He makes it utterly without form and void, then adds the startling information that it is psychical. Why? Because it cannot be physical. This is the fundamental idea of all its advocates. It is a new form of the Cartesian fallacy, for these revolutionaries who decry the old doctrine that all things immaterial must be conscious, take for granted that --conscious or unconscious -- all immaterial things must be mental.

The principle which, it seems to me, we should assume is not anything as occult and inconceivable as Unconscious Mind; it is the much more familiar notion that there are "subsistent" entities, which are not material and not mental, but logical, or abstract. They are known in philosophy as Universals. Such universals are the elements of the systems of logic and pure mathematics, and in the mathematical rendering of all systems whatsoever. It is they that constitute the third class of Reals, which Descartes failed to recognize -- Inextensa Res non Cogitans. Logical forms are the thing which Hartmann, Freud, Jung, Herbertz and others are dealing with when they speak of "unconscious images," "systems", "big X's" "psychical conditions" and other vague, psychical, unconscious somethings. The following should elucidate this cryptic proposition:

The manifestations of Mind are certain elements of consciousness arranged in a temporal --perhaps spatio-temporal -- order. Some of

them are related in obvious ways -- the so-called "sense-data" -- and these have given rise to our highly systematized idea of the physical world. Others, called images, feelings, ideas, etc. (Vorstellungen), are less convenient for scientific classification and predication, and do not fit into the scheme called "physical." These are denoted as psychical, not manifestations of the world, but of ~~the~~ mind.

The physical sciences no longer conceive of the world as a great substantive X whereof sense-data are the attributes. They regard it as a system, a logical construct, every moment of which corresponds to a space-time event. We have reason to believe that a perfect science of physics is ideally possible, i.e. that for at least one (possibly several) mathematical structures the correspondence of mathematical moments in that structure with events in space-time is absolutely precise.

Psychology is looking for just such a system -- a logical structure, viz. a scientific formula, which shall be perfectly equivalent to the spatio-temporal system called Mind. So far, all attempts to order the events of Mind according to any reasonably simple principle have failed. Ideas occur suddenly without any apparent connection -- this is especially noticeable in pathological cases, where the known laws of association seem to be entirely broken and the mind appears "irrational." The traditional view of such cases is, that internal physical events freely produce ideas which do not fit into the existing system. Now if this were the case, we would have to reject our entire formula of Mind. There can be no error in the actual space-time system, since every event whatever is a factor determining this system. Only our corresponding logical

construct can be subject to error.

Hartmann observed that certain ideas occur ~~which~~ ^{which} our common-sense psychology (which ~~is~~ ^{is} an association psychology) would naturally expect if certain other ideas had occurred. That is to say: we know that where a occurs, b may be expected to occur in consequence. Now, b is sometimes found where a has not occurred; therefore, to save the old order from ruin, he maintains that we must postulate an equivalent for a in an unknown mode of Mind -- an ~~a~~, or unconscious a.

Unfortunately, as Hartmann soon discovered, we can save our system only by "postulating" more events than the sum of all those which are actually given. Our author maintains -- quite justly -- that this is the proceeding of the physical sciences, which assume such events as atomic units of matter, and molecular motions, simply because these serve to carry out the one-one correspondence between the logical and the space-time systems. But he overlooks a crucial point; namely, that the events he asks us to postulate are not possible events in the given system. After all, molecular motion, atomic particles, are exactly the same sort of thing as molar motions and ~~perceptions~~ the difference is strictly quantitative. An analogy between physics and psychology would lead the latter not to Hartmann's unconscious images, but only to the "petits perceptions" of Leibnitz. Hartmann is asking us to assume, not a "psychical atomism," but a new kind of entity altogether, and one which is by definition inconceivable.

The "Philosophy of the Unconscious", as it stands, is certainly not a useful psychological formula, since we have no way of guessing

at or even imagining the contents of the Unconscious. The unconscious ideas are simply any ideas which would have upheld our association psychology, had they occurred -- which they did not. But Freud, and above all his occasional collaborator, Breuer, have discovered a law whereby the "unconscious ideas" may be guessed at; the "unconscious ideas" have their representatives in consciousness, images which seem quite out of joint with the rest of the mind-system, but act as the supposed "unconscious" idea could logically have been expected to act, had it occurred. They are symbols for, or symptoms of, the "unconscious ideas." They let us infer beyond doubt that the "Unconscious idea" exists as their generating cause.*

One of the established relations between the "unconscious idea" and its symptom in consciousness is, that when the idea becomes conscious the symptom disappears. ** This is, of course, the basis of psycho-analytic treatment; as such it does not interest us here. But presently we shall see that it is one of the principal factors in our theoretical study of Mind.

One of the first principles of Freudian psychology is, that every element once introduced into the system remains as a link in the association chain of the Mind. Let us retain this principle. The next premise is, that if an idea occurs together with another,

*S. Freud, Einleitung zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse, p. 316: "Die Möglichkeit, den neurotischen Symptomen durch analytische Deutung einen Sinn zu geben, ist ein unerschütterlicher Beweis für die Existenz -- oder...die Notwendigkeit der Annahme -- unbewusster seelischer Vorgänge."
 **Loc. cit.: "Aus bewussten Vorgängen werden Symptome nicht gebildet; sowie die betreffenden unbewussten bewusst geworden sind, muss das Symptom verschwinden." DEE infra: "Die Symptombildung ist ein Ersatz für etwas anderes, was unterblieben ist.....Es ist also etwas wie eine Vertauschung vorgefallen; wenn es gelingt, diese rückgängig zu machen, hat die Therapie der neurotischen Symptome ihre Aufgabe gelöst."

antagonistic one, the weaker (undesired) one is repressed, and henceforth continues its existence in the Unconscious. But its place in consciousness is not left vacant -- it is filled by an associated though (usually) altogether different idea, called its symptom.

This second premise I would flatly reject. So long as we have the datum called the "symptom" or symbol, we can construct a formula which does not require the actual persistence of the "unconscious" idea. The following is a rough sketch of such a formula:

(1) Every consciousness-event follows definite laws of occurrence, probably the "law of association" or some similar rule.

(2) A consciousness-event is a variable; it can be modified by other consciousness-events, and the ways of possible modification constitute the "symptoms" of the psycho-analysts.

Thus if an idea, a , be given as an element in the mind-system, we must compute its occurrences not as those of a , but of x , whose values will be a , a' , a'' , etc. according to circumstances which are (as yet) beyond our powers of calculation.

This variability of elements is the ear-mark of the psychic system. A psychic event has a range of modification unparalleled in the physical world. But this principle of variability permits us to assume that Mind is a system, wherein there is a perfect uniformity of behaviour for every given element -- one formula for the occurrence of x , of y , and of z ; if we take x , y , and z as ambiguous terms, having each a restricted number of values.

Undoubtedly there are laws governing the persistence of the particular values; this formulation in terms of variables lets

us suppose that we may apply the ordinary causal laws to this as to any other system, and need not yet resort to strange and problematic categories.* But the mind-system appears to be almost infinitely complex, wherefore our rendering in variables is probably an indispensable, though highly abstract, formulation. The practice of psycho-analysis is an empirical attempt to find and apply some of the laws whereby a' or a'' may be eliminated and replaced by the more familiar a -- or, perhaps, by a more desirable value, a''' , called the "sublimation" of a .

To assume, however, that a continues a subterranean life as in the Unconscious, or "metapsychological" sphere, is like saying that the number 6, once introduced into an equation, when replaced by $12/2$ or $2 \cdot 3$, continues its existence in the metamathematical world, whence it gives rise to an army of half-twelves and double-threes as they appear in the course of the computation.

The observed fact that "as soon as the idea comes into consciousness, the symptom is resolved," and that, moreover, "every suppressed idea is replaced by a symptom," corresponds perfectly to our formula; x cannot have two ^{actual} values, but must have one and just one where ever it functions at all. The "suppressed" idea is simply one possible value of the idea-function; x , and the symptom is another possible value. This seems to me a more adequate descrip-

*Cf. Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of Mind.

**This term is used analogously to Dr. H. M. Sheffer's "system-function".

tion of the "suppressed ideas" supposed to date from infancy, or from remote ancestry, which were never explicit ideas in the individual mind at all, wherefore "suppression" seems hardly an applicable term. The idea-function is here represented by an unfamiliar value, and to say that every "nonsensical" or fantastic idea is symbolic of some rational, "primitive" one, simply means that for every fantasy which does not fit our schematic description of Mind, there is one and just one idea-value which, if substituted for the fantasy, would fit into the system of memory, association, etc.. The apparently chaotic nature of Mind, as opposed to the tidy behavior of matter, is just as well accounted for by the use of variables in the descriptive formula as by the assumption of the tertium quid called the Unconscious.

Hartmann's Unconscious does not, at first sight, seem to bear any relation to this formula. His whole conception of Mind is based upon the notion of purpose, or -- in the case of unconscious Mind -- of teleology. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the psychology of purpose; suffice it to say that a purposive act is one which follows upon an idea of a (non-existent) state of affairs, and causes that state of affairs to become existent. Hartmann's argument, in the main, is as follows: many of our acts are such that we do not know their motivation, but benefit by their results. The motivation, however, must have been an idea of the result -- and since we were not aware of having this idea, i.e. did not know what the result of the act would be, it was an unconscious idea of the result.

Hartmann stretches the meaning of "motivated act" to take in every physical event. But as his best commentator, Arthur Drews, remarks, purpose -- i.e. motivated activity -- in a strict sense is applicable only to living matter.*

Now, Hartmann would undoubtedly admit that in the case of non-reflex human action, at least, some conscious idea precedes a useful act, although it may be a mere anticipation of pleasure. Impulsive action may not be consciously purposive, but certainly is inspired by some psychic event, i.e. some flash of conscious content. Here the ambiguous idea-function is the basis of two alternative ideas, which may find expression in the same act. In keeping with our hypothesis, one of them would fit the familiar notion of Mind -- that is to say, would be "rational". The other (which may be one of several other alternatives) is "fantastic". When, for example, we have an idea, *a*, whose expression should lead (according to our ordinary knowledge of events) to a percept *A*, we say that *a* is the idea of *A*, and the relation fits into a psychology as neat and simple as any physical science. But in such cases as Hartmann notes, of unconscious purpose, viz. teleology, this simple scheme does not suffice. Let us try the more complex pattern, where *A* is the expression of an idea-function, or class of alternative ideas, *x*. If the value of *x* which is here expressed in *A* was *a*, we speak of a purposive act; if, however, this value was an *a'*, probably very different from *a*, we speak of

*Arthur Drews, Hartmann's Philosophisches System im Grundriss, p.629: "Betrachten wir nun das aktiv Zweckmässige, so fällt dasselbe mit dem Lebendigen zusammen."

an impulsive or instinctive act, committed without the idea of A.

According to this schematization, Mind is a system whose terms are consciousness-events, which are given for our calculation as ambiguous values, or variables. To speak of conscious Mind or unconscious Mind is simply to emphasize the specific values of the idea-functions (the irreducible terms of Mind), or the intelligible form (the more abstract system whose terms are conceived as classes of consciousness-events). Hartmann comes very near to this use of Unconscious Mind when he declares it prior to space and time, i.e. devoid of all space-time event, the medium wherein all relations are implicit. Such a medium is, of course, a pure logical construct. This is also, unmistakably, the thing for which Herbart is groping, when he insists on his "psychical conditions" devoid of any quality. That which is devoid of qualities is ipso facto abstract -- again, a logical construct, like the body of propositional functions that constitute the "universe" of science.

There is, however, a confusing connotation ^{generally} ~~often~~ given to the term Unconscious Mind, and this has made the whole tempest in the philosophical tea-pot. Unconscious Mind was used by Hartmann (except in his perfectly inconsistent better moments), and is used by the psychoanalysts, to mean all those values of x, y, and z which would fit the familiar association psychology, but which as a matter of fact have been eliminated through the substitution of other values of x, y and z. They are the "rational" values -- the events which would have occurred had the actual system fitted our psychology, instead of suffering modification

through unforeseen factors. But if the modification has taken place, these "original" events or ideas are no more ideas than the totally impeded motion of a pendulum is a motion. They are ideal events, they exist in an abstract scheme, as equations whose terms cancel, just as does the motion of the pendulum ~~or~~ not in a reality called Unconscious Mind.

The recourse to Unconscious Mind is a very natural step for anyone used to dealing with realities in space and time rather than with forms of space and time, or space-time events. Had Hartmann really been the ingrained logician which Otto Braun sees in him, * he would have had no interest in postulating new kinds of Being, but merely new systems of relations. Freud is a brilliant psychiatrist, but a naive theorizer. He simply cannot believe that he has discovered new modes of behavior in the old metaphysical Given, but feels that something "real" must underlie his phenomena.

"We may challenge all the world," he says, "to account for this state of affairs in a more correct scientific way, and then we will gladly dispense with the assumption of unconscious psychical processes. But until then we will hold fast to this assumption, and must, with a shrug of the shoulders, reject as inconceivable anyone's objection that the Unconscious is nothing scientifically real, a makeshift, 'une façon de parler'. Something unreal, that has such tangible effects as an 'act of compulsion'!"**

I have accepted his challenge, and hope that the reader will consider my objection with more than a disparaging shrug.

*Cf. p. 6, ff.

** S. Freud, Vorlesungen, pp. 314-15

Bibliography.

Works by Eduard v. Hartmann:

Die Philosophie des Unbewussten, 9th ed.	Berlin 1882
Das Unbewusste vom Standpunkt der Physiologie und Deszendenztheorie, 2d ed.	1877
Grundriss der Naturphilosophie	Bad Sachsa 1908
" " Psychologie	" " "
" " Metaphysik	" " "

Critical Works on Ed. v. Hartmann:

Braun, Otto, Eduard v. Hartmann Ed. v. Hartmanns	Stuttgart 1909
Drehs, Arthur, Ed. v. Hartmanns philosophisches System im Grundriss	Heidelberg 1902
" " Das Lebenswerk Ed. v. Hartmanns	Leipzig 1907
Fischer, J.C. Ed. v. Hartmanns Philosophie des Unbewussten; ein Schmerzensschrei des menschlichen Verstandes,	
Hall, G.S. Eduard v. Hartmann	
Plummacher, O. Der Kampf um's Unbewusste	1880
Schmitt, M. Die Behandlung des Erkenntnis-kritischen Idealismus bei Ed. v. Hartmann	Berlin 1918

Psychoanalytic Literature

(this list is very brief owing to the sparsity of strictly theoretical writings in this field)

Freud, S.	Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse 2d ed.	Leipzig u. Wien 1918
" "	Die Traumdeutung 3d ed.	" " " 1911
" "	Jenseits des Lustprinzips 2d ed.	" , Zürich, " 1921 1921
Jones, E.	Freud's Theory of Dreams (Am. Journal of Psychology)	1910
Jung, C.G.	Die Theorie der Unbewussten Prozesse	Zürich 1917

- | | | |
|---|--|----------------------------------|
| Jung, C.G. | The Theory of Psychoanalysis
(Lectures delivered at Clark
University) | New York 1915 |
| Varendonck, G. | Ueber das Vorbewusste Phanta-
sierende Denken | Leipzig,
Wien, 1922
Zürich |
| <u>Miscellaneous Works on Unconscious Mind:</u> | | |
| Dunlap, K. | Freudianism, Mysticism, and
Scientific Psychology | |
| Dwelshauvers, G.L. | 'Inconscient | 1916 |
| Eisler, R. | Der Zweckbegriff | 1913 |
| Herbertz, R. | Bewusstsein und Unbewusstes | Köln (no date) |
| Hoernle, R.F.A. | Studies in Contemporary
Metaphysics | New York 1920 |
| James, William | The Hidden Self (in Scribner's) | New York 1890 |
| Lipps, Th. | Der Begriff des Unbewussten in
der Psychologie | München 1897 |
| Löwenfeld, L. | Bewusstsein und Psychisches
Geschehen | |
| Russell, B. | The Analysis of Mind | London 1921 |
| Schopenhauer, A. | Die Welt als Wille und Vor-
stellung (Sämtliche Werke) | Leipzig 1919 |
| Stricker, S. | Studien über das Bewusstsein | Wien 1897 |
| Volkelt, J. | Das Unbewusste und der Pessimismus | |
| Woodbridge, F.J.E. | The Problem of Consciousness
(in Studies in Philosophy and
Psychology by Students of
C.E. Garman) | 1906 |